Empiricism and Intelligent Design II: Analyzing Intelligent Design by Lutz, Sebastian





If intelligent design (ID) is to compete with evolutionary theory (ET), it
must meet the modified falsifiability challenge, that is, make some deductive
or probabilistic observational assertions. It must also meet the modified trans-
latability challenge, which it fails if ET makes all the observational assertions
of ID, while ID does not make all the observational assertions of ET. I discuss
four prominent and surprisingly diverse formulations of ID and show that each
either fails one of the two challenges or is analytically false.
Keywords: empiricism; intelligent design; empirical significance; empirical con-
tent; theism; auxiliary assumptions
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1 Introduction
The current discussion about the theory of intelligent design (ID) as a competitor of
evolutionary theory (ET) is logically related to arguments for theism and the question
of the empirical significance of theism. This is because the statement ‘God exists’ may
be translated as ‘[T]here exists necessarily a person without a body (i. e., a spirit) who
necessarily is eternal, perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and
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the creator of all things’ (Swinburne 2004, 7),1 which entails but is not entailed by
‘An intelligent designer exists’. Analogously, ‘God created the biological organisms’
entails but is not entailed by ‘An intelligent designer created the biological organisms’.
Because of the logical relation between theism and ID, two challenges to theism,
the falsifiability challenge and the translatability challenge, are also challenges to ID.
In this article’s companion piece, I have argued that the two challenges have to be
modified, and I will shortly review the results in §2. In this article, I aim to asses
whether ID meets either of the modified challenges by first elucidating a variety of
different and incompatible suggested definitions of ID (§3). Under one very plausible
definition, ID succumbs to the modified falsifiability challenge, and this entails that it
is analytically false under other definitions (§4.1). Under yet another definition, ID
succumbs to the modified translatability challenge (§4.2).
2 Two challenges
It is a plausible necessary condition for any empirical theory that it make at least
some observational assertions. Under the assumption that every theory that makes
observational assertions is incompatible with some observation statement, one can
therefore challenge ID proponents to name an observation statement with which the
theory is incompatible. However, the assumption that is used to justify this challenge
is false, and the challenge has to be modified. Instead of demanding falsifiability, one
can directly challenge a proponent of ID to spell out ID’s deductive or probabilistic
observational assertions.
Definition 1. A theory H makes deductive observational assertions if and only if
there are honest auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement O such that
H ∧AO and A 6O . (1)
A set A of auxiliary assumptions is honest if and only if every S ∈A is a justified
statement, and A also contains every statement on which the justification of S
depends.
Definition 2. A theory H makes probabilistic observational assertions if and only if
there are honest auxiliary assumptions A and an observation statement O such that
Pr(O |H ∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) . (2)
Pr(O |H ∧A) is called the likelihood of H (for O). These definitions (Lutz 2010,
§9.2; 2011, §5.2) are intended to avoid the problems of corresponding definitions by
Sober (2008, 151; 2008, 152).
The inequality (2) is meant to have a truth value even if one or both of the
occurring terms are undefined (Lutz 2011, §5.2): If both terms are undefined, the
inequality is false, if only one of them is undefined, the inequality is true. It is indeed
plausible that H makes observational assertions if assuming H makes it impossible
to assign a probability to an observation statement that otherwise would be assigned
1With a further reference to his discussion of the trinity, Swinburne adds in a footnote: “In under-
standing God as a person, while being fair to the Judaic and Islamic view of God, I am oversimplifying
the Christian view.”
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a probability by the auxiliary assumptions. For if Pr(O |A) is defined, then, given
A, one must expect a specific regularity of occurrences of O. But if Pr(O |H ∧A) is
undefined, one must expect a breakdown of this regularity, and this expectation is
plausibly a prediction.
The translatability challenge in its original form amounts to the claim that theism
can be replaced by a set of observational statements without loss of cognitive content.
The challenge rests on highly controversial assumptions about cognitive content,
and is best supplanted by the challenge that a theory cannot replace a competing
one if the competing theory is not disconfirmed and makes all the observational
assertions of its suggested replacement, while the replacement does not make all the
observational assertions of the competing theory.
Definition 3. Theory H1 makes all the deductive observational assertions of H2 if and
only if for all honest auxiliary assumptions A and all observation statements O,
H2 ∧AO only if H1 ∧AO . (3)
Definition 4. Theory H1 makes all the probabilistic observational assertions of H2 if
and only if for all honest auxiliary assumptions A and all observation statements O,
Pr(O |H2 ∧A) = Pr(O |A) or Pr(O |H2 ∧A) = Pr(O |H1 ∧A) . (4)
Clearly, a theory that fails the modified falsifiability challenge also fails the modi-
fied translatability challenge if it competes with a theory that makes any observational
assertions and is not disconfirmed.
3 What is the theory of intelligent design?
To determine whether ID fails either of the two challenges, it is necessary to know
more or less precisely what the theory of intelligent design is. Sober (2007, 3)
considers a minimal version of ID:
The single thesis of what I will call mini-ID is that the complex adapta-
tions that organisms display (e. g., the vertebrate eye) were crafted by an
intelligent designer.
Since a theory is more likely to fail either of the two challenges the weaker it is, mini-
ID is unfairly minimal: According to Hartwig and Meyer (1993, 160), for example,
“the concept of intelligent design predicts that complex information, such as that
encoded in a functioning genome, never arises from purely chemical or physical
antecedents”. While Sober only refers to complex adaptations of organisms, Hartwig
and Meyer refer to any kind of complex information. The technical term in the ID
literature is ‘complex specified information’ (‘CSI’).2 Thus ID should be taken to be
the statement that the objects with CSI were caused by an intelligent designer.
According to Sober (2008, 148; cf. 2008, 130; 2007, 4), “it is perfectly clear” that
ID entails the existence of objects with CSI (in his version of ID, the existence of
complex adaptations). Whether this is so depends on how the definite article is
2In this section, it suffices to rely on an intuitive notion of CSI: New York, brains, and computer
chips have it, Kasimir Malewitsch’s “Black square”, rocks, and sweat do not.
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interpreted. Under a suggestion by Sharvy (1980, 615), who follows Russell (1905),
Sober’s version of ID is to be paraphrased as “There is a collection of objects with CSI
such that all collections of objects with CSI are its parts, and this collection of objects
with CSI was caused by a designer”. If there are no objects with CSI, there cannot be a
collection of them, so that in this paraphrase, ID entails the existence of objects with
CSI. The same holds for a suggestion by Brogaard (2007, 164), which leads to the
paraphrase “There are objects with CSI that were created by a designer and all objects
with CSI are some of them”. Brushing over the subtleties of the natural language
formulation, both paraphrases can be formulated as ‘There are objects with CSI and
all objects with CSI are caused by an intelligent designer’.3 Letting, for any x and y,
ðDyñ stand for ðy is an intelligent designerñ and ðC y xñ stand for ðy caused xñ, this
leads to the following paraphrase of Sober’s definition of ID:
ID 1. There are objects with CSI, and for all objects x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (5)
Russell’s definition of the definite article is not the only plausible one. According
to Strawson, the definite article indicates that the existence of the objects in its
scope is presupposed, that is, a background assumption (cf. Ludlow 2009, §4.2).
Assuming that ‘CSI’ is an observational concept, ‘There are objects with CSI’ is
justified by observations. The statement can thus be an honest auxiliary assumption,
and assuming that the statement is in A, ID can be defined as follows:
ID 2. For all x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (6)
ID 1 entails but is not entailed by ID 2. Hartwig and Meyer (1993, 160) arguably
have ID 2 in mind when they claim that ID entails that CSI never arises from purely
chemical or physical antecedents without claiming that ID entails the existence of
objects with CSI. Dembski (2006, emphasis removed) states that “[p]roponents of
intelligent design, known as design theorists, [ . . . ] claim that a type of information,
known as specified complexity, is a key sign of intelligence.” If ‘key sign’ means
‘sufficient condition’, then proponents of intelligent design claim that all complex
specified information is caused by an intelligent designer, that is, ID 2.
Sober’s version of ID is not the only one suggested. Some are obviously wrong:
Dembski and Wells (2008, 3) define intelligent design as the “study of patterns in
nature that are best explained as the product of intelligence”, which would make ID
a field of study like physics, not a theory like Newtonian mechanics. As a field, it
would therefore not make any assertions and succumb to the modified falsifiability
challenge. Other definitions differ radically in their logical structure from ID 1 and
ID 2: According to the Discovery Institute (N. N. 2010a),4
[t]he theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the uni-
verse and of living things are best explained by an intelligent cause, not
an undirected process such as natural selection.
3The substitution of ‘caused’ for ‘created’ is meant to align the paraphrase with the definitions of ID
proponents discussed below.
4I thank Casey Luskin for helpful discussions about this definition.
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Two sections below (N. N. 2010b), the “certain features” of the universe and living
things are further specified:
Intelligent design begins with the observation that intelligent agents
produce complex and specified information (CSI). Design theorists hy-
pothesize that if a natural object was designed, it will contain high levels
of CSI. Scientists then perform experimental tests upon natural objects to
determine if they contain complex and specified information. One easily
testable form of CSI is irreducible complexity, which can be discovered
by experimentally reverse-engineering biological structures [ . . . ].
Thus it is claimed that, starting from the observed relation between intelligent agents
and CSI, ID theorists conjecture that all natural objects caused by an intelligent
designer contain CSI and go on to search for natural objects with CSI.5 Note that
the ID theorists only conjecture that in our world, the material implication from an
intelligent cause of an object to the occurrence of CSI in that object is true, which is a
statement of factual co-occurrence. It is another step to the claim that an intelligent
cause explains the occurrence of CSI (see the discussion in connection with ID 3 and
§4.1). The further assumption that undirected processes do not explain CSI or are
unlikely to do so (critically discussed, for example, by Häggström (2007a,b)) then
leads to the Discovery Institute’s definition of ID.
Thus the Discovery Institute’s definition can be paraphrased as follows:
The theory of intelligent design holds that those features of the universe
and of living things with CSI are best explained by an intelligent cause,
not an undirected process.
Since living things are in the universe, their mention is redundant.6 Since an intel-
ligent cause (a designer) is claimed to explain features with CSI best, it is claimed
to explain the features better than any process without an intelligent cause. In the
following I will call any such process ‘undirected’. Finally, the explanation of a feature
F by a cause C only makes sense if C is the cause of F . Identifying ‘being caused by’
and ‘being the result of’, the definition can once more be paraphrased as
The theory of intelligent design holds that for all x with CSI, the state-
ment that x was caused by an intelligent designer explains the CSI of
x better than any statement according to which x was caused by an
undirected process.
The further discussion of the Discovery Institute’s definition will rely on the
explication of ‘explanation’. This is a notoriously difficult subject, and for this reason,
few if any scientific theories rely on the concept as a primitive.7 For a definition of
5 This is somewhat puzzling because the conjecture does not seem to be inductively supported by
the observations and, in fact, false: Even many objects intentionally produced by intelligent agents, for
example the “Black Square”, anvils, and (sometimes) sweat, do not show CSI. Note that the conjecture’s
converse is just ID 2, and thus cannot be assumed to be inductively supported without begging the
question (cf. Sober 2008, 176).
6Logically redundant, that is. Mentioning living things puts an emphasis on the main application of
ID, irreducible complexity in organisms.
7Of course, it is claimed of many theories that they explain some phenomenon or other, but that
does not mean that the theory itself uses the concept of explanation.
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ID, there are good reasons not to connect explanation to the psychological concept of
understanding, for one because then a good explanation for one person is not always
a good explanation for another who may, for example, lack specific background
knowledge. Furthermore, if explanation is connected to understanding, ID becomes
a theory that is at least in part about human psychology rather than objects with CSI.
The classic non-psychological explication of ‘explanation’ relies on deductive
inference (cf. Hempel 1965), so that, roughly, given our background assumptions
A, H1 explains O better than H2 explains O if H1 ∧A  O and H2 ∧A 6 O. Like-
lihoods provide another way to explicate what it means to be a better explanation,
by stipulating that H1 explains O better than H2 if Pr(O |H1 ∧A)> Pr(O |H2 ∧A).
Using the abbreviations from ID 1 and further letting, for any x, ðCSIxñ stand for a
description of the CSI of x, the Discovery Institute’s version of ID is captured by
ID 3. Given our background assumptions A, for all x with CSI and any undirected
process u,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∧A CSIx and C u x ∧A 6 CSIx (7)
or
Pr(CSIx | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∧A)> Pr(CSIx |C u x ∧A) . (8)
Background assumptions are almost always needed to assign probabilities to or
infer observation statements, and background assumptions should be honest (Lutz
2011, §§3.2, 5.2), which I will assume in the following.
ID 3 states a logical or probabilistic relation between design and CSI relative to our
background assumptions. This makes ID 3 a rather odd theory: It is not a statement
that in fact relates to specific observable phenomena as a matter of logic or probability
theory, but it postulates that some other statement does so relate.
In an elaborate discussion of ID, Monton (2009, §2) suggests multiple improve-
ments to the Discovery Institute’s definition that also avoid the problematic concept
of explanation. He conjectures that ID proponents “wouldn’t take much solace in
the knowledge that their appeal to an intelligent cause is the best explanation, if
we’ve established that their explanation is a false one”. Monton (2009, 38, emphasis
removed) therefore suggests a preliminary improvement:
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe
and of living things are the result of an intelligent cause, not an undirected
process such as natural selection.
Keeping in mind that the certain features are those with CSI and that a feature cannot
be the result of both an intelligent cause and an undirected process, this paraphrase
amounts to ID 2. Since ID 2 differs radically from ID 3 in its logical structure, the
justification for this modification is somewhat wanting.
In “a bit of charitable speculation”, Monton (2009, 38) suggests that ID proponents
speak of an intelligent designer as the best explanation because one of the “key ideas
behind intelligent design is that their theory is scientific, and one can get scientific
evidence for the existence of the intelligent designer”. Therefore “the actions of
the intelligent cause [must not be] completely hidden from us”. Monton (2009, 38,
emphasis removed) thus suggests another preliminary definition (∗):
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain features of the universe
and of living things provide evidence for the existence of an intelligent
6
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cause, and provide evidence against the doctrine that the features are the
result of an undirected process such as natural selection.
The exact nature of ID then depends on how ‘providing evidence for’ is explicated.
Monton (2009, 100) assumes that the evidential relationship is to be explicated
by probability theory, and in probabilistic terms, a theory H is confirmed by an
observation O given the auxiliary assumptions A if and only if Pr(H |O ∧ A) >
Pr(H |A) and disconfirmed if and only if Pr(H |O ∧A) < Pr(H |A) (Howson and
Urbach 1993, §7a). This leads to
ID 4. Given our background assumptions A, for all x with CSI and any undirected
process u,
Pr
 ∃y(Dy ∧C y x) |CSIx ∧A> Pr ∃y(Dy ∧C y x) |A (9)
and
Pr(C u x |CSIx ∧A)< Pr(C u x |A) (10)
Of course, there are other conceptions of confirmation. Sober (2008, §1.3), for
example, argues that evidential support should be construed contrastively, so that
an observation statement ðCSIxñ confirms ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ and disconfirms ðC u xñ
relative to each other if and only if Pr(CSIx | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x ∧A)> Pr(CSIx |C u x ∧A).
This explication of confirmation and disconfirmation leads to the second disjunct,
equation (8), of ID 3.
Monton’s second modification (∗) of the Discovery Institute’s definition brings
his own definition again closer to the original (and to ID 3), since ID again claims
a probabilistic relation between a designer and CSI. His argument for the second
modification may indeed provide the reason for the Discovery Institute’s definition of
ID, but it is an odd one nonetheless: Rather than trying to develop a theory involving
a designer that is scientific, that explains something, or that can be supported by
evidence, ID theorists, according to Monton’s argument, simply postulate that for
any x with CSI, ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ is scientific, explains something, or is supported by
evidence. I will discuss the implications of this move in §4.1.
Monton (2009, 38) charges that both the Discovery Institute’s definition of ID and
his preliminary definition (∗) are trivially true, because in a crucial point, Monton’s
interpretation of the Discovery Institute’s definition of ID differs from the one
assumed in ID 3 and ID 4. This becomes clear when Monton (2009, 72) discusses the
assertions of ID:
I would say that intelligent design proponents are making a prediction:
they are claiming that, if one looks, one will find evidence that there is a
designer.
I have read ‘certain features’ in the Discovery Institute’s definition as a placeholder for
‘instances of CSI’. Monton instead reads ‘certain features’ as ‘some features’, so that
ID becomes the claim that there are features that are best explained by an intelligent
cause, not by an undirected process.
Under this reading, it is indeed indisputably and almost trivially true that there
are certain features of the universe that provide evidence for a designer and against
the claim that they are the result of an undirected process. The Petronas Towers in
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Kuala Lumpur and Sarah Watson’s muscular arms are examples (Monton 2009, 16,
23).
I have argued above for my interpretation, and it also fits better with Hartwig
and Meyer’s claim about the impossibility of CSI arising from purely physical or
chemical antecedents, the central role that CSI and irreducible complexity play in
the exposition of ID by Dembski and Wells (2008), and specifically Dembski’s claim
that “if there is a way to detect design, specified complexity is it” (Dembski 2002,
116). The lengths to which Monton has to go to avoid the almost trivial truth of
ID provide another argument against his interpretation. His final definition is this
(Monton 2009, 39, emphasis changed):
The theory of intelligent design holds that certain global features of the
universe provide evidence for the existence of an intelligent cause, or that
certain biologically innate features of living things provide evidence for
the doctrine that the features are the result of the intentional actions of
an intelligent cause which is not biologically related to the living things,
and provide evidence against the doctrine that the features are the result
of an undirected process such as natural selection.
Except for the change from a conjunction to the disjunction (here emphasized), all the
modifications are attempts at avoiding the almost trivial truth of ID (Monton 2009,
17–26). None of the modifications are necessary under the interpretation defended
here, since it does not render ID almost trivially true, and renders the mention of
living things in the Discovery Institute’s definition redundant.8
It is furthermore doubtful that Monton avoids triviality or something close to
it. If, for example, the hypothesis of a designer asserts a certain feature F in all
organisms, while no undirected process does, the existential quantification allows to
include all and only those organisms with feature F in the evidence. If the hypothesis
of a designer, but no undirected process, asserts a specific ratio of F , the existential
quantification allows to pick out a set of organisms that has this very ratio as long
as there are enough organisms with and enough organisms without the feature to
assemble the set. Therefore, as long as the hypothesis of the designer makes any such
assertion, ID is true under Monton’s definition.9
4 The two challenges to ID
The previous section has resulted in four versions of ID. ID 1 is Sober’s own clarifica-
tion of his definition, using Russell’s paraphrase of the definite article. ID 1 entails
ID 2, which itself is a clarification of Sober’s definition that relies on Strawson’s
paraphrase of the definite article. The Discovery Institute’s definition can be clarified
as ID 3. Finally, while Monton’s final definition of ID is flawed, his preliminary
8Note that neither ID 3 nor ID 4 exclude the alleged fine-tuning of cosmological constants as evidence
for an intelligent designer (which is a focus of Monton’s discussion): Dembski (2002, xiii) claims that
the fine-tuning is an instance of CSI.
9Monton (2009, 35, 109) also seems to existentially quantify over all designers, as he rather freely
chooses the designer’s intentions (to let an atom decay at one specific moment or to have as much
intelligent life as possible, for example). Strictly speaking, Monton is thus not dealing with the question
whether there could be any evidence ðCSIxñ for ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ, but with the question whether there
could be a y such that there could be any evidence ðCSIxñ for ðDy ∧C y xñ.
8
Sebastian Lutz Empiricism and Intelligent Design II—Draft: 2011-05-12
definition (∗) suggests ID 4 if Bayesianism is used as a criterion of confirmation, and
the probabilistic disjunct of ID 3 if likelihoodism is used.
In this section, I will discuss which of these versions of ID meets which of the
two challenges discussed in §2. For this discussion, I will assume that CSI is an
observational concept. This assumption is charitable because either challenge is easier
to meet the more terms in a theory are observational, and because CSI is observational
only if it is well-defined, which is disputed, for example, by Elsberry and Shallit (2009,
§§4–6).
4.1 The modified falsifiability challenge
According to Swinburne (2004, 7), ‘God’ is, in the three world-religions, synony-
mous with ‘A necessarily existing person without a body who necessarily is eternal,
perfectly free, omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and the creator of all things’.
This synonymy is therefore a justified auxiliary assumption, which allows to infer
from God’s existence that all objects, and hence all objects with CSI, are caused by
a person (and hence a designer). Any explanation of a phenomenon by this theory
is, according to Swinburne (2004, 47ff), a personal explanation, and as such it relies
essentially on the intentions and abilities of the designer, in this case God. ID 2 is a
personal explanation as well and therefore entails an observation (for example the de-
scription of the CSI of some object x) only in conjunction with two specific auxiliary
assumptions. The first states that any designer who caused an object x with CSI has
intentions ix and abilities ax , that is, with ðI yixñ standing for ðy has intention ixñ
and ðByaxñ standing for ðy has ability axñ:
For all x with CSI: ∀y(Dy ∧C y x→ I yix ∧Byax ) . (11)
The second states that a designer who caused x with intentions ix and abilities ax
brings about the observation Ox :
For all x with CSI: ∀y(Dy ∧C y x ∧ I yix ∧Byax →Ox ) . (12)
If some x has CSI, observation Ox then follows because for all x with CSI,
∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∧∀y(Dy ∧C y x→ I yix ∧Byax )∧
∀y(Dy ∧C y x ∧ I yix ∧Byax →Ox ) Ox . (13)
For probabilistic assertions, the likelihoods of ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ can be given
through generalizations of the deductive premises. Instead of claiming that if x was
designed by y, y has intention ix and ability ax , it is enough to assert that if x was
designed, the probability that it was designed by some y with intention z and ability
w has the probability pxy zw :
pxy zw = Pr
 
Dy ∧C y x ∧ I y z ∧Byw | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x) . (14)
The second deductive auxiliary assumption (12) can be relaxed to the claim that if
a designer y of x has intention z and ability w, then an observation O has probability
qxy zwO :
qxy zwO = Pr(O |Dy ∧C y x ∧ I y z ∧Byw) . (15)
9
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The probability for O for any x with CSI can then be written as10
Pr
 
O | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)=∑
y zw
pxy zw qxy zwO . (16)
In the theistic theory, the abilities of the designer are known within the precision
of natural language: God is omnipotent. The intentions of God are also known
within the precision of the word ‘good’.11 ID 2 differs from the theistic theory in
this respect: The designer who caused an object with CSI is only specified as being
intelligent. Leaving the problem of the level of intelligence aside, Sober (1999, 62f;
2007, 6; 2008, §2.12, §2.15) argues in a number of ways that the intentions of the
designer are unknown. Among them is his point that the designer could be an
extraterrestrial, which would give no indication about the intentions. But ‘designer’
is even less specific than ‘extraterrestrial designer’, and thus would give even fewer
indications of the intentions (Sober 1999, 65f). And sometimes, the problem of evil
is solved by claiming that the intentions of God are unknowable. This answer entails
that the intentions of a less specific designer are also unknowable (Sober 2008, §2.17).
Sober (1999, 74, n. 25; 2007, 6; 2008, 128, 154, n. 29) also gives lists of proponents of
ID who state that the intentions of the designer cannot be known.
In general, for any designer with the intentions and the abilities to do something,
one can without inconsistency think of another designer without those intentions or
abilities. Thus the first auxiliary assumption (11) of the deductive assertion of Ox (13)
is unjustified for any intention and ability, with (arguably) one exception. If one
observes Ox for some x, then one can plausibly infer that if there is a designer of x, the
designer had the intention to bring about Ox . With the further plausible assumption
that having the intention and ability to bring about Ox , a designer would bring about
Ox , one can infer Ox . But then, for the auxiliary assumptions to be honest, they have
to contain assumption Ox if they contain the first auxiliary assumption. Therefore,
ID 2 in conjunction with honest auxiliary assumptions entails Ox only if the auxiliary
assumptions alone already entail Ox , and thus ID 2 makes no deductive observational
assertions.
ID 2 makes a probabilistic assertion, that is, assigns a probability to some ob-
servation O, only if the sum (16) is defined. The sum in turn is defined only if
the conditional probabilities (14) and (15) are defined, again because ID 2 relies on
personal explanations. But analogously to the deductive case, for any designer who
would have some intention and ability with one probability, one can, without flout-
ing the laws of probability, think of another designer who has that intention and
ability with any other probability. Thus the first auxiliary assumption (14) is un-
defined for almost all intentions and abilities. Similar to the deductive case, the
exceptions are those cases in which observation O can be assigned a probability s
independently of assuming a designer. For some O and x, one can then maybe justify
the assumption that if a designer caused x, the designer must have had the intention
and ability to bring about O with probability s . (It is here not obvious what values
the probabilities in the two auxiliary assumption have to have, only that the sum
of their products has to be s for O.) But if Pr(O) = s is used to justify the auxiliary
10The condition in equation (15) for term qxy zwO does not need to contain the conjunct ð∃y(Dy ∧
C y x)ñ, as this is entailed by ðDy ∧C y xñ for any y.
11This assumes that ‘good’ has its usual meaning in theistic statements. The contrary assumption
lead to the original falsifiability challenge (Flew 1950, 258f).
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assumptions, it has to be in the auxiliary assumptions as well if they are honest. Thus,
ID 2 only assigns probability s to O if the auxiliary assumptions do, too. Therefore
ID 2 makes no probabilistic observational assertions either, and thus succumbs to the
modified falsifiability challenge.
As already noted, the problem with ID 3 and ID 4 is that, rather than make
observational assertions, they postulate deductive or probabilistic relations between
the existence of an intelligent designer and observations. Given the results so far, one
can see that the postulates are, in fact, false: ID 3 is true only if, given our background
assumptions A, equation (7) or equation (8) is true for every x with CSI. Equation (7)
states that for each x, ð∃y(Dy ∧ C y x) ∧ Añ entails a description of the CSI of x,
while ðU x ∧Añ does not. But ID 2 makes no observational assertions for any honest
auxiliary assumptions, and for each x with CSI, ð∃y(Dy∧C y x)ñ is a logically weaker
claim than ID 2. Since CSIx is assumed to be an observation statement, and our
background assumptions are specific honest auxiliary assumptions, ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ
therefore asserts no description of the CSI of x. Hence equation (7) is false for all
x, and ID 3 is false unless equation (8) is true for all x. This holds only if for all x
with CSI, the probability for the CSI of x given ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ is higher than its
probability given any undirected process u, and thus specifically ET. Sober (2008)
has argued extensively that the complex adaptations we observe can be explained
by ET, and thus are certainly not less probable under the assumption of ET than
they are given our background assumptions. Therefore equation (8) is true only
if the probability for the CSI of x given ID 2 is higher than given our background
assumptions. But again, since ID 2 and thus ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñmake no observational
assertions, this is false. ID 3 is therefore analytically false, because it postulates an
inferential relation that does not exist.
ID 4 is true only if all undirected processes, and thus also ET, are disconfirmed and
ð∃y(Dy∧C y x)ñ is confirmed by each x with CSI given our background assumptions.
Sober (2007, 2008) has documented at length that ET has not been disconfirmed by
each such x and thus ID 4 is false independently of the status of ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ
because equation (10) is false. But ID 4 would be wrong even if ET were disconfirmed
by each x with CSI: Purportedly, there are objects for which the designer cannot be
directly observed and which show CSI. For those objects, ð∃y(Dy ∧C y x)ñ has to be
confirmed by observations other than those of the designer. This holds if and only if
equation (9) holds, which is equivalent to
Pr
 
CSIx | ∃y(Dy ∧C y x)∧A

> Pr(CSIx |A) . (17)
But this inequality cannot be true for the same reason that equation (8) cannot be
true, namely because ID 2 makes no observational assertions.
This leaves ID 1, Sober’s definition, which as Sober himself has pointed out, meets
the modified falsifiability challenge.
4.2 The modified translatability challenge
ID 1 clearly makes the deductive observational assertion that there are objects with
CSI. But ID 1 is equivalent to the conjunction of this existence claim and ID 2, and I
have argued in §4.1 that also in conjunction with honest auxiliary assumptions, ID 2
makes no observational assertions. Under the assumption that ‘CSI’ is a well-defined
observational concept, it is a justified and hence honest auxiliary assumption that
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there are objects with CSI.12 Therefore ID 1 entails only observation statements that
are also entailed by this existence claim, and assigns the same probabilities as this
existence claim.
ID 1 fails to meet the modified translatability challenge against ET if ET makes
all the observational assertions of ID 1, but ID 1 does not make all the observational
assertions of ET. Sober (2008, §2.9) argues that if the existence of objects with CSI (or,
in his discussion, of complex adaptations of organisms) is to be explicitly included in
ID, it should also be included in ET. This is plausible, as the definite article should be
interpreted in the same way, no matter whether the statement is ‘The objects with
CSI were caused by an intelligent designer’ or ‘The objects with CSI are the result of
natural selection’. This is also in keeping with the description of ID by the Discovery
Institute that led to ID 3, because it refers to the intelligent cause and undirected
processes in the same way.
With both ID 1 and ET entailing the existence of objects with CSI (let this be claim
E ), ET makes all the deductive observational assertions of ID 1. Unless there is an
observation O such that Pr(O |E∧A) 6= Pr(O |A) and Pr(O |E∧A) 6= Pr(O |E∧ET∧
A), that is, E alone makes a probabilistic observational assertion different from ET, ET
also makes all the probabilistic observational assertions of ID 1. Then, since ET makes
observational assertions besides E , ID 1 does not meet the modified translatability
challenge. But even if E alone makes a probabilistic observational assertion different
from ET, ID 1 fails to meet the modified falsifiability challenge against many other
statements: E itself makes all the observational assertions of ID 1, and, for example,
the claim E ′ that there are organisms with eyes makes more.
5 Conclusion
Probably the most important result of the elaboration of ID in §3 is that ID is woefully
underspecified, leading to different explications with vastly different properties. ID 2
makes no observational assertions and thus fails to meet the modified falsifiability
challenge, ID 1 makes fewer observational assertions than ET and in fact the simple
claim that there are organisms with eyes, and thus fails to meet the modified trans-
latability challenge. ID 3 and ID 4 are wrong, not because of incorrect observational
assertions, but rather because they make incorrect logical or probabilistic claims.
ID is also often formulated with so little precision that even charitable interpreters
(which I take Monton and me to be) can arrive at fundamentally incompatible
conclusions about its content. An especially egregious example is the description of ID
in two of the major textbooks on ID. Beyond defining ID as a field of study, Dembski
and Wells (2008, 109) claim that ID “neither requires nor excludes speciation—even
speciation by Darwinian mechanisms. ID is sometimes confused with a static view
of species, as though species were designed to be immutable. [ . . . ] ID precludes
neither significant variation within species nor the evolution of new species from
earlier forms”. Davis and an H. Kenyon (1993, 99f), on the other hand, state that ID
“means that various forms of life began abruptly through an intelligent agency, with
their distinctive features already intact: fish with fins and scales, birds with feathers,
beaks, and wings, etc.”
12Again because one can observe many objects that, intuitively, have CSI: Miami, eyes, etc.
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Biologists have found overwhelming evidence for common descent, and thus even
with this last addition to the superabundance of varieties of ID, the conclusion stays
the same: ID fails as a scientific theory, because it is disconfirmed by the evidence,
because it makes false inferential claims, because it fails the modified falsifiability
challenge, or because it fails the modified translatability challenge. But it fails.
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